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Three recent studies (Pearson, 2012; Pearson, Ross, & Webster, 2012) purported to test the revised dual
representation theory of posttraumatic stress disorder (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010) by
manipulating the amount of additional information accompanying traumatic stimulus materials and
assessing the effect on subsequent intrusive memories. Here we point out that these studies involve a
misunderstanding of the meaning of “contextual” within the theory, such that the manipulation would
be unlikely to have had the intended effect and the results are ambiguous with respect to the theory. Past
and future experimental tests of the theory are discussed.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.The dual representation theory of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) was recently updated to
be consistent with developments in cognitive neuroscience
(Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Byrne, Becker, & Burgess,
2007). In this revision the involuntary ﬂashbacks characteristic of
the disorder were proposed to arise from an imbalance or disso-
ciation between sensory-bound and contextual representations
encoded at the time of the trauma. In three studies with healthy
volunteers Pearson and colleagues (Pearson, 2012; Pearson, Ross, &
Webster, 2012) attempted to test the theory by manipulating the
amount of additional information made available to participants
exposed to traumatic materials. These authors obtained results that
they concluded were inconsistent with the revised dual represen-
tation theory (DRT). However, Pearson’s experimental interpreta-
tion appears to contain a fundamental misunderstanding of the
meaning of “context” in the DRT, which is unfortunately com-
pounded by the way they employ an experimental analogue of
traumatic experience. We conclude that, insofar as their results areealth Psychology, University
.
incipal Research Fellowship.
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-Ninterpretable with respect to the DRT, the studies of Pearson and
colleagues offer mild support to the theory.
The DRT assumes that two different types of memory repre-
sentation are encoded at the time of the traumatic event. One type
of representation includes sensory details and affective/emotional
state experienced during the traumatic event (sensory-bound
representation or S-rep for short). The other includes a subset of the
sensory input, recoded into an abstract structural description, along
with the spatial and personal context of the person experiencing
the event (contextual representation or C-rep for short). Thus, S-
reps and C-reps are not primarily distinguished by the type of input
(e.g. sensory versus verbal) but represent different aspects of the
input that are derived from it by different types of processing. In
healthy memory the S-rep and C-rep are tightly associated, such
that an S-rep is generally retrieved via the associated C-rep. Access
to C-reps is under voluntary control but may also occur involun-
tarily. According to the DRT, direct involuntary activation and re-
experiencing of S-reps occurs when the S-rep is very strongly
encoded, due to the extreme affective salience of the traumatic
event, and the C-rep is either encoded weakly or without the usual
tight association to the S-rep. This might be due to stress-induced
down-regulation of the hippocampal memory system (Jacobs &
Nadel, 1985), and/or due to a dissociative response to the trau-
matic event.
Within the DRT, one aspect of therapy or normal recovery can be
considered to be (re)association of the S-rep with its corresponding
C-rep, so that the sensory and affective/emotional representation of
the traumatic event can be seen in its appropriate context. This hasD license.
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that context (the associated C-rep) and current personal context to
be appreciated and used to control the retrieval of the S-rep,
allowing integration with other autobiographical knowledge, and
facilitating deliberate recall and communication of the details of
the traumatic event. The proposed imbalance between S-reps and
C-reps in PTSD is also consistent with the observation that, while
intrusive sensory and affective representations of a traumatic event
are frequent in PTSD, consciously controlled “context-dependent”
or “episodic” memories for the traumatic events are often impaired
(Brewin, 2013). The DRT also corresponds to animal studies of fear
conditioning, in which acquisition of the association between a
sensory stimulus and an aversive event leads to subsequent
involuntary fearful responses to the stimulus, such as fear-
potentiated startle. These changes depend on associative links be-
tween sensory representations and internal representations of
emotional states in the S-rep, and likely mediated by the amygdala.
However, the expression of these fearful responses is controlled by
the C-rep (likely mediated by the hippocampus) so that, for
example, they only occur within the same physical context inwhich
the aversive event was experienced.
A number of studies have sought to test the theory using the
trauma ﬁlm paradigm adopted by Pearson and colleagues (Holmes
& Bourne, 2008). In these studies participants are exposed to seg-
ments of ﬁlm lasting several minutes that include traumatic or
disturbing elements, and the occurrence of involuntary images
from the ﬁlm is measured over the succeeding week using a daily
diary. The trauma ﬁlm paradigm is designed to attract and hold
participants’ attention, provoke arousal and feelings of personal
involvement and empathy, mimicking a real-life event. To this end
an auditory commentary is typically included that provides a
context for the scenes being shown (e.g., it describes who the vic-
tims of a car crash were and where they were going at the time of
the accident). An extensive body of research shows that empathy
(Levine & Edelstein, 2009), as well as arousal and personal
involvement (Holland & Kensinger, 2010), increase the probability
of recall. In fact, auditory commentaries have been shown to pro-
duce intrusive visual images even when unaccompanied by any
visual materials (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010).
Pearson (2012) sought to test DRT by either presenting or
withholding the auditory commentary shownwith the trauma ﬁlm.
Similarly, Pearson et al. (2012) presented or withheld similar
explanatory material associated with traumatic pictures (giving
them the label of either ‘war’ or ‘crime’). In their three studies those
images accompanied by explanatory material intruded more
frequently over subsequent days.
By referring to the additional information as “contextual”
Pearson et al. assumed that, according to the DRT, its presence
should automatically strengthen C-reps relative to S-reps and thus
reduce the number of intrusions. However, as explained above, the
way a traumatic event is encoded into S-reps and C-reps within the
DRT does not bear any straightforward relationship to the amount
of additional information present in the input, or its modality of
presentation. Rather, it results from an interaction between the
information contained in the input and how the input is processed
(as determined by factors such as hippocampal efﬁciency, concur-
rent distractor tasks, or dissociation). Thus, simply manipulating
the presence of additional information does not test the theory in
the way assumed by Pearson and colleagues.
Since S-reps encode the affective and emotional states experi-
enced, providing additional information concerning the traumatic
images that increases the participant’s arousal, understanding of
what is being shown, personal involvement, or empathy, may
strengthen the S-rep corresponding to the traumatic event, con-
trary to Pearson et al.’s assumption. This additional involvementmay also weaken the C-rep because participants are less aware of
their own spatial and personal context. Conversely, any direct effect
on the C-rep of additional information concerning the traumatic
images would depend on the relationship of this information to the
participant’s own spatial and personal context, and would probably
be negligible in the Pearson et al. studies. Thus, according to the
DRT, the additional information presented by Pearson and col-
leagues could increase subsequent intrusive imagery, in line with
their ﬁndings, and the ﬁndings of Krans et al. (2010).
The variable effects of supplying additional information could be
tested by carrying out experiments similar to Pearson’s that also
include a control condition in which other kinds of material
accompanied the scenes (for example, information that the scenes
were from a training ﬁlm or that the scenes depicted in images had
been staged). A prediction that could validly have been derived
from DRT is that additional emotionally valenced or empathetic
information should lead to increased intrusive imagery relative to
information that increases the participant’s sense of distance from
the traumatic event shown.
How else might the proposed relationship between S-reps, C-
reps, and intrusive imagery be tested? Much previous work has
focused on the prediction that concurrent visuospatial tasks that
compete for resources with S-reps during encoding or consolida-
tion will reduce the number of later intrusive images, whereas
verbal tasks that compete for resources with C-reps will increase
the number of intrusive images. Thus, manipulations have focused
on changing the way the sensory input is processed at, or very soon
after, encoding. A recent review (Brewin, 2013) found that visuo-
spatial tasks, such as pattern tapping or playing the video game
Tetris, during or shortly after watching the ﬁlm did reduce subse-
quent intrusions, relative to a control condition, in 12 out of 13
studies. The effects of concurrent verbal tasks were more varied.
Whereas counting backwards in 3s or 7s reliably increased intru-
sive images relative to baseline, other tasks such as remembering a
9-digit number had no effect on them. This suggests that only some
verbal tasks compete successfully for resources with C-reps,
consistent with the revised version of the theory, which stresses
the nature of the representations involved rather than their mo-
dality per se.
Another approach has been to investigate the different charac-
teristics of S-reps and C-reps laid down in remembering a visuo-
spatial scene. S-reps, being sensory-bound should correspond to
the egocentric image speciﬁc to the viewpoint from which the
scene was perceived, whereas C-reps should correspond to a more
abstract structural representation of the allocentric spatial context
depicted in the scene. Processing by the hippocampus is speciﬁcally
required for recognizing an object’s location within a scene when
tested from a shifted point of view as compared to recognizing it
from the same point of view (King, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-
Khadem, & O’Keefe, 2002; King, Trinkler, Hartley, Vargha-
Khadem, & Burgess, 2004), consistent with the proposed neural
mediation of C-reps within DRT (in this case, spatial context).
Accordingly, Bisby and colleagues (Bisby, King, Brewin, Burgess,
& Curran, 2010) measured individual differences in participants’
ability to remember object locations from the same or from a
shifted point of view prior to showing them a trauma ﬁlm. Weak
shifted-view memory relative to same-view memory predicted
increased intrusive memories over the following week. Using
similar methods Glazer and colleagues (Glazer, Mason, King, &
Brewin, 2013) found that the naturally occurring intrusive mem-
ories of individuals with weaker shifted-view location memory
were more strongly characterised by a lack of temporal context
(increased “nowness”).
These very recent experiments suggest a number of new op-
portunities to test DRT. The theory suggests that certain pre-
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pocampal functioning such as above average allocentric spatial
processing will confer protection against the development of PTSD.
Neuroimaging investigations could compare the structural and
functional neural correlates of ﬂashbacks in PTSD patients to the
brain structures proposed to support S-reps and C-reps (see, for
example, Kroes, Whalley, Rugg, & Brewin, 2011; Whalley et al.,
2013). On the treatment side, DRT suggests that PTSD will be hel-
ped by interventions that either enhance ventral stream processing
of trauma memories, for example by encouraging the visualisation
of trauma scenes from alternative perspectives, or interfere with
dorsal stream processing, for example using transcranial direct-
current stimulation.
In conclusion, we welcome the attempts of Pearson and col-
leagues to test the DRT in novel ways, but we hope that future
experiments avoid further confusion associated with the multiple
potential uses of the word “context”. To facilitate this, we have
outlined some of the ways inwhich the DRT has been tested, how it
might be tested further in future, and how this knowledgemight be
exploited for the beneﬁt of patients.References
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